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basis of state law.
Although the best course is to try to avoid having to make the "actual
innocence of death" showing, some defensive preparation for making the
claim is necessary. Since Sawyer limits the showing of "innocence of
death" to aggravating factors alone, defense counsel should begin
litigation of Virginia's "vileness" and "future dangerousness" aggravating factors at the pre-trial stage. Defense counsel should file a motion for
a bill ofparticulars asking the Commonwealth to identify the aggravating
factor(s) upon which it intends to rely in seeking the death penalty and,
generally, to identify all evidence which it intends to produce in support
of the aggravating factors identified. These steps not only preserve issues
for appeal, but also help narrow the issues should the capital defendant
argue "actual innocence of death" at the federal level.
More specifically, defense counsel should state in this motion that
if the Commonwealth intends to prove "vileness," the court should order
the Commonwealth to identify which components of that aggravating
factor - torture, depravity of mind, aggravated battery - it intends to
prove. The motion for a bill of particulars should also request that the
Commonwealth identify any unadjudicated acts which it intends to offer
as evidence of future dangerousness. If the court grants the motion,

defense counsel should also argue that the jury instructions must be
limited to the aggravating factors enumerated in the bill of particulars.
If the trial court orders the Commonwealth to provide a bill of
particulars to the defense, federal courts may be precluded from relying
on other aggravating factors to argue that reasonable jurors could have
found the defendant death eligible. For instance, had the prosecution in
Sawyer's capital trial relied solely on Louisiana's "aggravated arson"
aggravating factor,34 Sawyer's Brady claim might have been sufficient
to establish "actual innocence of death," for without that one aggravating
factor, no reasonable juror could have found Sawyer to be death eligible.
Under those circumstances, the court could not have then found that a
reasonable juror still could have found Sawyer to be death eligible under
35
Louisiana's "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor.
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles

34 La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.4(c) (West 1984).
35 La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.4(g) (West 1984).

TREVINO v. TEXAS
112 S.Ct. 1547 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1983, Joe Mario Trevino, of Hispanic descent, was charged with
the murder and rape of eighty-year-old Blanche Miller, a capital offense
in the State of Texas. Prior to the jury selection in his trial on February
1, 1984, Trevino's counsel filed a "Motion to Prohibit the State from
Using Peremptory Challenges to Strike Members of a Cognizable
Group." The motion stated: "This common use of the State's peremptory
challenge in a criminal trial deprives the Accused of due process and a
fair trial. This practice deprives the Accused of ajury representing a fair
cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution." The trial court did not rule on the motion
until the voir dire. During voir dire, the State used its peremptory
challenges to excuse the only three black members of the panel. After
each ofthese strikes, defendant's counsel renewed his motion. Each time
the court denied his motion.
Trevino was convicted by an all-white jury, and the court sentenced
Trevino to death. Trevino appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals for
Texas and filed his brief in December, 1985. Renewing his pretrial
motion and objections, Trevino contended that the prosecution's use of
its peremptory challenges was based solely on race and that such a use
violated his "rights to due process of law and to an impartial jury fairly
drawn from a representative cross section of the community," basing his
claim on the provisions of the Texas Constitution and the Sixth and
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Five years after Trevino filed his brief in the Court of Criminal
Appeals for Texas, that court affirmed Trevino's conviction and death
sentence.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Holland v.
Illinois,2 which held that peremptory challenges based upon race are not
prohibited by the Sixth Amendment. The appellate court stated in a
1 Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592 (1991).
2 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
3 Trevino v. State, 815 S.W. 2d at 598, n.3.
4 Trevino v. Texas, 112 S.Ct. 1547, 1550 (1992).
5 Id.
6 Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a defendant
can make a prima facie case for an equal protection violation by showing

footnote that Trevino's arguments "did not amount to a reliance on the
Equal Protection Clause. ' 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed
4
and remanded.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that Trevino had adequately
preserved his claim at trial that the prosecution's race-based use of its
5
peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause. TheCourt
appeal,
on
direct
was
presented
case
Trevino's
that
because
found
also
he was entitled to retroactive application ofthe rule announced inBatson
v. Kentucky. 6 The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal
7
Appeals for Texas and remanded the case for further proceedings.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Trevino had conceded to the Court of Criminal Appeals for Texas
that under Swain v. Alabama8 there was no equal protection violation for
the race-based use ofperemptory challenges in a single case. However,
Trevino noted that the United States Supreme Court was considering the
9
question under the Sixth Amendment in Batson v. Kentucky. Trevino
of
requirement
relax
the
not
did
decision
argued that even if the Batson
a pattern of discrimination, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals should
prohibit race-based peremptory challenges as a matter of state law.
The United States Supreme Court held in Batson in April 1986 that
if a defendant could make aprimafacieshowing that the prosecution had
used its peremptory challenges to strike members of the defendant's race
from the jury, the prosecution would bear the burden of proving another
justification for the strikes.1 0 The Batson court based its decision not
upon a Sixth Amendment rationale, but upon an equal protection basis.
that the State exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude members of
the defendant's racial group)).
7 Trevino, 112 S.Ct. at 1550.
8 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
9 No. 84-6263, cert. granted,471 U.S. 1052 (1985).
10 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Georgia1 I
established the steps a criminal defendant is required to take to preserve
an equal protection claim regarding the prosecution's race-based use of
peremptory challenges. In Ford,the defendant filed a pre-trial motion
similar to Trevino's. Although Ford's motion did not specifically
mention the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court held that he had
adequately raised this claim by reference in his motion to the "exclusion
of black jurors 'over a long period of time"', and his counsel's argument
12
to the same effect.
In Trevino, the defense relied on a similar argument in its motion.
In addition, in his argument before the trial court, Trevino's counsel
expressly contended that the Supreme Court "would modify Swain's
burden of proof and that the Texas courts should anticipate" that
decision. 13 The Supreme Court, therefore, found that although Trevino's
claim was not expressly presented as an equal protection claim to the trial
court, he had adequately raised the essence of the claim to preserve its
consideration.14 The Court further found that Trevino had preserved his
equal protection claim before the Court of Criminal Appeals because
"[h]is argument caption made an express reference to the Fourteenth
Amendment and the issue presented for review was the very same one
that he had raised before the trial court." 15 Finally, the Court noted that
when the State of Texas filed its brief in Trevino's appeal about a month
after the Batson ruling, it did not contend that Trevino's argument was
not based on equal protection, but rather that Batson did not apply in
Trevino's case because the strickenjurors wereblack, while Trevino was
Hispanic (a claim that later lost merit when the Court decided in Powers
v. Ohio 16 that a defendant need not be of the same race as the challenged
jurors).
The Court also recognized that Trevino was entitled to the Batson
rule because his case was presented on direct appeal. Prior to Griffith v.
Kentucky, 17 new Supreme Court rules could not be applied retroactively
if the new rules were a "clear break" from the past rules. The Griffith
court, however, determined that the "clear break" exception was inappropriate and announced that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in
18
which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past."
The Supreme Court's decision in Trevino demonstrates the significance of preserving federal issues for appeal. The defendants in both
Trevino and Ford benefitted from a change in the law but only because
defense counsel were deemed to have raised the issues at the trial level.

11 111 S.Ct. 850 (1991). See case summary of Ford, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 6 (1991).
12 Ford,Ill St. Ct. at 854-855.
13 Trevino, 112 S.Ct. at 1550.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 111 S.Ct. 1364(1991).
17 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
18 Id. at 328. A new rule, however, will not apply to cases that are
presented for collateral review. In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989),
the Supreme Court found that the habeas petitioner had failed to assert a
Swain equal protection claim at trial or on direct appeal. Therefore, the
petitioner forfeited his right to review of the claim in state court, and
subsequent review of the issue in a federal habeas corpus proceeding was
barred. See case summary ofWilliams v. Dixon, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue; case summary ofAdams v. Aiken, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue; and case summary of Stringerv. Black, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue (discussing application of the Teague rule).

Therefore, it is particularly important to timely raise any colorable
federal issues during the trial process even if they are not currently
accepted under the law. The Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
require that in order to preserve an issue for review, counsel must timely
state the objection at trial "with reasonable certainty." 19 In addition,
counsel must assign the ruling as error 20 and argue the issue in the appeal
2
brief. t
Trevino also reaffirms the principle that state procedural default
rules when applied to federal constitutional rights are a matter of federal
law.22 The Trevino court expressly overruled the Texas court's finding
of default and in effect spelled out the standard state courts are to apply
in determining whether an equal protection claim has been defaulted.
Consequently, where counsel is faced with a Commonwealth argument
that a federal constitutional claim has been procedurally defaulted,
counsel should explore an argument that the constitutional claim was
adequately preserved as a matter of federal constitutional law.
During jury selection in Virginia cases, it is important that, where
appropriate, the Commonwealth's peremptory strikes be challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
order to present a Batson challenge to such peremptory strikes, the
defendant must make a prima facie showing of purposeful race discrimination in the exclusion of a juror. If the defendant makes a prima facie
case, then the burden shifts to the prosecution to offer a neutral explanation for the strike. The trial court must then rule whether the strike was
based upon race.23
Defense counsel should also remember that under Holland v.
Illinois24 and Powers v. Ohio,25 a defendant has standing to assert a
juror's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim that his or her
exclusion from the venire was based upon race, even if the juror and the
26
defendant are not of the same race. In addition, Hernandezv.New York
recognized that the state's neutral explanation for a peremptory strike
may only disguise purposeful discrimination based upon race. It has also
been held that the state's explanation for a peremptory challenge must be
evaluated in light of the level of inquiry given to other jurors seated on
the venire.27 Therefore, in order to establish an improper exercise of a
peremptory challenge, the record must reflect the content and depth of
the prosecution's examination of the otherjurors who were not excluded
from the venire.
Summary and analysis by:
Susan F. Henderson
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Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:27.
Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:17.
See Johnson v. Miss., 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) ("'[W]ehave

consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a
federal question is itself a federal question."') (quoting Hemy v. Miss.,
379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965)).
23 The Supreme Court has also applied the Batson rule to peremptory strikes made by the defendant. See Georgiav. McCollum, 112 S.Ct.
2348 (1992).
24 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
25 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991).
26 111 S.Ct. 1859 (1991).
27 Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. 1987) (cited in Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 176, 380 S.E.2d 1 (1989)).

